Can the new French economy policy be successful ? by Sterdyniak, Henri & Mathieu, Catherine
Can the new French economic policy
be successful?
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), Paris, France
In early 2013, the French economy, like many other EU economies, faces tough challenges.
French GDP is 9 per cent below the level it would have reached had it continued to grow at
its pre-crisis trend. France has committed to cut the public deficit to 3 per cent in 2013 and
0 per cent in 2017 which would imply dramatic public spending cuts and fiscal tightening,
reducing GDP growth even further. France has to choose between strengthening its spe-
cificity, its social model and its State-interventionist tradition, and imitating the best pupils
of globalization in the world or in Europe by implementing liberal or social-liberal strat-
egies. The paper deals with the French government strategy since the 2012 presidential
elections and tries to assess its chances of success. In many areas – fiscal strategy, social
issues, banking and industrial policies – there is a significant risk that the announced
proactive strategy will be replaced by policies accepting the constraints imposed by
European institutions and financial markets.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In early 2013, the French economy, like many other EU economies, faces four main
challenges. French GDP is still below its pre-financial crisis level and 9 per cent below
the level it would have reached had GDP continued to grow at its pre-crisis trend.
Between the first quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2013, GDP growth was almost
flat. The unemployment rate has been above 10 per cent since the beginning of 2013
and has kept rising, with no sign of reversal.
The fall in output has led the public deficit to reach 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2011.
Under the pressure of financial markets and EU authorities, France has committed to
cut this deficit to 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2012 and to 3 per cent in 2013. This would
imply a fiscal tightening of around 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2012 and 2.5 per cent of
GDP in 2013. But such a tightening reduces GDP growth. The question is: How to
escape from this spiral?
France suffers from problems in the manufacturing sector. The French current account
turned from a surplus of 2.6 per cent of GDP in 1997 to a deficit of 1 per cent of GDP in
2007, and of 2 per cent of GDP in 2012. From 1997 to 2012, French market shares in
world exports fell from 5.3 per cent to 3.3 per cent (−38 per cent), in parallel with the
experience of Italy and the UK, while German market shares declined only moderately
(−7 per cent). The central questions now are: How to restore the French productive
structure? Is there a need for a ‘competitiveness shock’ to organize substantial transfers
from households to companies?
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France has to choose between strengthening its specificity, its social model and its
State-interventionist tradition, and imitating the best pupils of globalization in the
world or in Europe by implementing liberal or social-liberal strategies. Yet, Europe
suffers from low growth and is unable to exit from the crisis. Trade and financial glo-
balization have initiated the 2007 financial crisis. Should France jump onto a train
which is about to derail?
In May 2012, François Hollande, the socialist candidate, was elected President of
the French Republic, and a coalition of socialists and greens won the legislative elec-
tions soon afterwards. This paper describes the strategy of the French government
since these elections and tries to assess its chances of success. It shows that in
many areas, there is a significant risk that the announced proactive strategy will be
replaced by accepting the constraints imposed by the European institutions and
financial markets.
2 THE EUROPEAN STRATEGY
The current state of EU economic governance is such that each Member State (MS)
economic policy is constrained by European commitments which impose fiscal consol-
idation and liberal reforms. What policy measures may then a government elected on
a social-democratic programme implement?
François Hollande wrote in his presidential manifesto in January 2012:1 ‘I want
to reorient European construction. I will offer our partners a pact of responsibility,
governance and growth in order to exit the crisis and the austerity spiral which aggra-
vates it. I will renegotiate the EU Treaty, through favouring growth and employment,
reorienting the ECB’s role towards that direction’. In June 2012, François Hollande
faced a major dilemma: signing the Fiscal compact meant accepting the liberal stance
of the EU strategy; not signing the Fiscal compact meant opening a crisis in the EU.
2.1 The fiscal compact2
The fiscal compact (the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) strengthens
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), although the latter was a failure. The fiscal com-
pact is one more step forward both from liberal proponents against Keynesian economic
policies, and from EU authorities against autonomous domestic fiscal policies. The
Treaty aims at making the dream of the liberals come true: totally paralysing fiscal
policies; imposing public budgets in balance at any cost.
According to the Treaty, budgets should be run in balance in structural terms,
which has no economic justification. The true ‘golden rule of public finances’3 allows
1. Proposal No 11 in François Hollande’s manifesto, Le Changement c’est Maintenant - Mes
60 Engagements pour la France, January 2012: ‘Je veux réorienter la construction européenne.
Je proposerai à nos partenaires un pacte de responsabilité, de gouvernance et de croissance pour
sortir de la crise et de la spirale d’austérité qui l’aggrave. Je renégocierai le traité européen issu
de l’accord du 9 décembre 2011 en privilégiant la croissance et l’emploi, et en réorientant le rôle
de la Banque centrale européenne dans cette direction.’
2. See also Bird/Mandilaras (2012) or Mathieu/Sterdyniak (2013).
3. This rule was developed at the end of the nineteenth century by Von Stein (1885), Leroy-
Beaulieu (1891) and Jèze/Boucard (1896). It can also be found for instance in Musgrave (1939)
or Eisner (1989).
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governments to borrow to finance public investment. Besides, households, insurance
companies and financial institutions wish to own a safe financial asset, like public
debt, and consequently, a structural public deficit is required. Fiscal policy should
aim at maintaining a satisfactory demand level, inducing the highest employment
level consistent with stable inflation and an interest rate equal to the nominal growth
rate: there is no evidence that the corresponding level of public deficit is nil. Since euro
area MS do not control their interest rates and their exchange rate, they need degrees of
freedom in terms of fiscal policies.
The Treaty imposes a rapid convergence towards the balanced budget in structural
terms according to a trajectory to be set by the Commission without accounting for
cyclical conditions. An automatic mechanism should be introduced to correct devia-
tions from this trajectory. Temporary deviations should be allowed if they result
from ‘exceptional circumstances’ or ‘from a negative growth rate or from the accumu-
lated loss of output during a protracted period of very low growth relative to potential
growth’, but corrective measures should be rapidly implemented. In fact the Commis-
sion refuses to recognize that euro area countries have been in such a situation since
2009 and insists on requesting rapid cuts in deficits.
The Treaty relies on the structural deficit concept. But its measurement is problem-
atic, especially after strong macroeconomic shocks.4 In fact, the Treaty specifies
that the Commission’s estimates will have to be used. But they have two drawbacks.
First, the Commission’s potential output estimates are always close to observed output,
because they consider as structural the reduction of the capital stock resulting from a
fall in investment during the crisis, like a large part of the decline in potential labour
force (due to unemployed people’s discouragement), of the fall in productivity, and
the rise in the unemployment rate: thus they underestimate the cyclical element of
the deficit and will hence impose pro-cyclical policies. Second, these estimates are
strongly revised over time. For instance, potential output estimates for 2006 were
revised substantially downwards in 2008.
MS will have to introduce independent institutions in charge of verifying that the
balanced budget rule and the convergence to the trajectory path are met. This is one
more step towards full technocratic management of fiscal policy.5
A country under an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) will have to submit its
budgets and its structural reform programmes to the Commission and the Council,
who will keep their implementation under surveillance. This article is a new weapon
to impose automatic fiscal consolidation and liberal reforms.
The Commission’s proposals will be adopted automatically unless there is a quali-
fied majority against them, the country concerned not voting. Thus, in practice, the
Commission will always have the last word.
The Treaty is based on an implicit but incorrect theory: automatic stabilizers should
play, but discretionary fiscal policies to support activity should be prohibited. But such
policies are needed to support full-employment (Lerner 1943 or Mathieu/Sterdyniak
2013). The fiscal pact aims at preventing any autonomous national fiscal policies.
Fiscal policies should become automatic and aim at balancing budgets, just like mone-
tary policy should aim at fighting inflation; growth and employment should be sought
by liberal structural reforms.
4. See the method in D’Auria et al. (2010) and critical assessments in Mathieu/Sterdyniak
(2011) or Truger/Will (2013).
5. On Independent Fiscal Committee, see Wyplosz (2002; 2011), Fatás (2003), Calmfors/
Wren-Lewis (2011) and Mathieu/Sterdyniak (2013).
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According to the Treaty, each country should run restrictive measures without
accounting for its economic situation and for other MS policies. The Treaty assumes
implicitly that restrictive policies have no impact on GDP. If we consider the situation
in 2012, this implies that most countries run austerity policies even if their public
deficits result from insufficient output levels following the burst of the financial bubble
and not from structurally excessive spending.
2.2 The growth pact
In June 2012, France did not obtain any renegotiation of the Treaty, and merely obtained
that the European Council adopted a Compact for Growth and Jobs. In spite of this title,
it is not symmetric with the Fiscal Compact. It embeds no explicit target in terms of jobs
or growth. It mostly includes already undergoing plans, some of them being of liberal
inspiration: the Europe 2020 strategy, the need to guarantee the sustainability of pension
systems, the improvement of the quality of public expenditure, the promotion of labour
mobility, the fostering of competition in the areas of services, energy and public
services. Growth-friendly measures are rather limited. An amount of €120 billion is
mentioned (1 per cent of euro area GDP), but these measures apply over an undefined
time period, and at a time when austerity programmes amount to €240 billion per year.
Moreover, the impact of the promised €120 billion is questionable: €60 billion of it
is supposed to come through an increase in the European Investment Bank’s lending
capacity thanks to a €10 billion increase in capital; €5 billion is supposed to be created
by issuing Project bonds to finance infrastructure projects, and €55 billion will consist
of already budgeted structural funds being re-allocated towards ‘measures targeted to
support growth’. The French government pretends to have obtained a major change
in EU policies. In fact, the Compact for Growth and Jobs has not been integrated into
the European major policies. The European Council decision from January 2013 to
cut the European budget over the coming years marks the end of any hope of an active
fiscal policy at the European level.
In fact, the French government ratified the Fiscal Pact to avoid creating a political
crisis in Europe, fearing that this would block any progress towards financial solidarity
and economic coordination in Europe and that it would lead to a new wave of financial
market speculation which could force several southern countries to leave the euro.
But the Fiscal Compact implies abandoning fiscal policy autonomy while EU policies
will remain dominated by economic policies orthodoxy, and accepting a long fiscal
restrictive period.
2.3 The organic law
The French government has chosen an ad minima reading of the Treaty, since the new
fiscal procedure is not included in the Constitution, but only in an organic law.6 This
law sets up a High Council of Public Finance, which will give its advice on macro-
economic forecasts underlying the budget laws. It will assess whether the budget is
consistent with EU commitments and with the budget programming law. It will
give its opinion on the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’.
6. In France, an organic law is intermediate between the Constitution and an ordinary law.
It deals with government organization and rules. It must be agreed by the Constitutional Council.
It requires an absolute majority in the Assembly.
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One may wonder what will be the degrees of freedom of the High Council. One
may fear that the Council will not dare to conclude that the adjustment path is too
restrictive or that the medium-term objective is not realistic. In the event of an econ-
omic slowdown, the Council will have to choose between promoting an expansionary
policy to support growth and claiming for austerity measures to restore public
finances.
The High Council is chaired by the President of France’s Court of Audit (Cour des
comptes), and consists of five members from the Court of Audit, the INSEE’s Director,
and five members appointed by the President of the National Assembly, the President
of the Senate, the Presidents of the Finance commissions of the National Assembly and
of the Senate, and the President of the Environmental, Economic and Social Council.
The predominance of the Court of Audit in the Council is problematic. Its judicial
officers are submitted to the hierarchical authority of their president; they are not
macroeconomic experts, and are more concerned with public finance balance than
with growth and employment. Among the 11 members of the Council, 8 will autom-
atically be in favour of consolidation policies. Article 21 of the organic law states that
the Council’s deliberations will be confidential and that no minority view will be
expressed in its reports.
Fiscal policy choices must be subject to democratic procedures. The assessment of
economic policy belongs to scientific and democratic debates. It should not be entrusted
to a High Council, consisting mainly of judicial experts, rather than economists on the
one hand and representatives of the nation on the other.
The High Council will only give advice, which neither the government nor the
parliament are obliged to follow, but there is a high risk that this advice will affect
financial markets’ and the European Commission’s assessments and that it would be
risky for the government to ignore it. A left-wing government should not have
accepted handing over the conduct of the French fiscal policy to a technocratic-led
authority, instead of an elected Parliament.
3 THE ONE-EYED MACROECONOMIC STRATEGY
In the presidential campaign, François Hollande announced that France would fulfil its
commitment to bring the deficit down to 3 per cent of GDP in 2013 and to equilibrium in
2017 (Table 1). Thus he accepted the most arguable elements of the Pact – that is, a
medium-term budgetary position in balance, and a trajectory of public balances inde-
pendent of economic developments. Its programme implies a highly negative fiscal
impulse in 2013 (−1.6 per cent of GDP) in order to reach the 3 per cent target; the fiscal
impulse will remain negative afterwards, by around 0.6 per cent per year. François
Hollande’s programme differs from the right wing party’s programme as strong
increases in taxation are planned in the short term (2 per cent of GDP from mid 2012
to 2013); but it relies also on low public spending growth in the medium term.
This raises three issues:
1. It is debatable that a left-wing government durably exert downward pressure on
public spending, knowing the needs for social (pensions, health, family, education)
and economic (companies’ support, public investment) spending.
2. The programme abandons the objective of filling the gap between current and
pre-crisis trend output. Under the assumption that the output gap was close to
−9 per cent of GDP in 2012, it would still be close to −7 per cent in 2017.
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3. The macroeconomic consistency of the programme depends on the size of the fiscal
multiplier. Let us assume that the multiplier equals 1 for a strictly French fiscal
policymeasure and 1.33 for a measure applied to the euro area. François Hollande’s
programme assumes implicitly that, in the absence of restrictive fiscal measures,
GDP would have grown by 3.3 per cent in 2013, and by 2.85 per cent from 2014
to 2017 (Table 1, last three lines). The programme abandons hopes of a growth
rebound. It accepts that French GDP loses 4 per cent in 2017 in order to bring
public finances into balance, while a public deficit of 2.2 per cent of GDP in
2017 would have been consistent with the true ‘golden rule for public finances’
and with public debt stabilization.
Let us consider the issue from another perspective: let us assume that France expects
GDP to rise by 3 per cent in 2013, under neutral fiscal policies in the EU. The French
public deficit will fall from 4.5 per cent to 4 per cent of GDP. In fact, the constraint is
to bring the public deficit to 3 per cent. France should therefore implement restrictive
policies amounting to 1 per cent of GDP. Since all euro area countries will do the
same, the GDP growth forecast will be revised downwards to 1.7 per cent and the
deficit will reach 3.67 per cent of GDP. There will therefore be a need for additional
austerity measures of 0.67 per cent of GDP, etc. In the end, the successive austerity
measures will result in a 3 percentage of GDP fiscal effort and a contraction of
GDP of about 1 per cent.
3.1 The 2013 budget
In September 2012, the LPFP (Loi de Programmation des Finances Publiques)
embeds slower growth in 2012–2013: the output gap estimate has been reduced to
−1.1 per cent in 2012. The potential output growth estimate is 1.3 per cent only for
2012 and 1.6 per cent for the following years. The government has resigned itself
to a slow growth path.
In the 2013 budget, the fiscal impulse is negative, by −2 per cent of GDP for 2013,
of which 0.5 of a percentage point comes from expenditure cuts and 1.5 percentage
Table 1 Macroeconomic prospects in François Hollande’s programme
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
GDP growth** 1.7 0.5 1.7 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25
Government balance* −5.2 −4.5 −3.0 −2.3 −1.6 −0.8 0.0
Interest payments* 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0
Public expenditure* 56.3 56.5 56.3 55.8 55.3 54.6 53.9
Primary expenditure** 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9
Tax-to-GDP ratio* 43.7 45.1 46.5 46.6 46.8 46.8 46.9
Fiscal impulse* −1.5 −1.6 −0.6 −0.6 −0.6 −0.6
Neutral policy: fiscal impulse* 0 0 0 0 0
GDP** 3.3 2.85 2.85 2.85 2.85
Government balance* −3.8 −3.4 −3.0 −2.6 −2.2
Note: *As a percentage of GDP; **in %.
Source: Hollande (2012: 40 fn2).
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points from higher revenues. The government bets on the assumption that increasing
taxes on the wealthiest and on large companies will have a small impact on demand.
The number of civil servants remains stable: the rise in public service employment
in some areas (education, police, justice, employment) is offset by cuts in other sectors.
The general increase in public wages (point de la fonction publique) remains nil. Some
public investment expenditure (in culture, defence and justice) are cancelled. All in all,
public expenditure cuts will amount to €10 billion. A strict management of public
spending is pursued, albeit preserving the main functions of the State.
At the time of writing, in May 2013, the French economic outlook remains weak.
GDP growth was nil in 2012, and, according to the OFCE or the European Commission,
will be nil also in 2013. The public deficit will stand at around 3.7 per cent of GDP
in 2013, clearly above 3 per cent, due to the low growth, which means that austerity
policies will have to be pursued in 2014. In order to meet the balanced budget target
in 2017, and with the commitment not to increase taxes any further, the government
will have to cut public spending by €70 billion (6.5 per cent of current spending).
The government seems ready to abandon its growth objectives, to reduce the support
to French companies, to downsize the French social model, for an arbitrary goal of
reaching a balanced public budget in structural terms. But the government estimates
that it is tied by the European constraints and financial markets, and continues to run
a restrictive fiscal policy albeit hoping (without saying it) that a softer fiscal stance
will be agreed at the EU level.
4 A RIGOROUS TAXATION POLICY
François Hollande (2012: 15) wrote: ‘I want to introduce a major tax reform. Each
one’s contribution will be made fairer by a major reform merging in the future the
income tax and the CSG. Capital incomes will be taxed like labour incomes’.
A number of French economists and politicians advocate a major tax reform. But
some advocate a strong reduction of the tax burden (which implies a corresponding
decrease in public spending). Some propose to shift the social protection burden
from companies to households, which is not possible without significantly lowering
households’ purchasing power and consumption? Others are in favour of a fairer
distribution of the tax burden between labour and capital incomes, of increasing the
degree of redistribution in the French tax-benefit system. But France already has
one of the most redistributive systems, with relatively heavy taxes on the richest
and on capital incomes. Some suggest a simplification of the French system, to abolish
tax exemptions, to broaden the tax bases and to lower the tax rates. But they forget the
incentive role of taxation. Many fiscal schemes, even complex, are justified for social
fairness reasons, like the quotient familial7 or for job creation incentives, such as social
contributions exemptions on low wages.
The French tax system has four characteristics as compared to its EU partners, and
in particular with Germany (Table 2): France has two income taxes (IR, a progressive
tax with many exemptions and complications, and CSG, a flat contribution upon all
personal income), but their cumulated weight is relatively light, while property
taxes are relatively heavy. Employers’ social contributions are high; employee contri-
butions are relatively low. The business tax (taxe professionnelle) is relatively heavy.
7. In the French income tax, the family income is split between each family member (a child
counting for 0.5) before being submitted to the tax schedule.
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Capital taxation is relatively high, while consumption taxation is rather low. Of course,
there is no reason why French taxation should be brought in line with taxation in other
EU countries. It is normal to have high social contributions in a country where social
insurance benefits are high. The high level of employers’ contributions is partly offset
by the level of net wages. However, these figures would suggest that France should
increase the weight of its income tax and VAT, and should reduce employers’ social
contributions;8 in other words, it should implement a strategy of competitive internal
devaluation, which is problematic in the EU context.
In 2012–2013, the government’s strategy is to move towards a fairer taxation,
weighing more on large companies, on the financial system and wealthiest households,
and abolishing some tax cuts that the conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy (and
even Jacques Chirac) had implemented, in particular abolishing some tax exemptions.
The government faces a difficult trade-off: increasing taxation on the wealthiest people
and the largest companies is consistent with its aim of tax fairness; it may have a
smaller impact on demand than taxation on the whole population, but, in an open
economy, it introduces risks of losses of competitiveness and attractiveness and of
tax optimization and tax evasion behaviours.
Table 3 shows the measures taken by the government for 2012–2013, which
amount to €32 billion per year (€11 billion on firms or banks, €11 billion on the richest
households, €10 billion on all households).
Concerning the business sector, the government has not introduced measures to
reduce corporate taxation on SMEs or on reinvested profits, owing to public finance
constraints and contrary to what François Hollande had announced. The corporate
tax rate on large companies thus remains at 36 per cent, which is the highest level
in Europe (the euro area average is 26 per cent).
Table 2 Structure of taxation, in percentage of GDP in 2007
Germany France
Total 37.3 42.4
Personal income 9.4 7.0
Corporate income 1.3 1.5
Employees’ social contributions 6.3 4.1
Employers’ social contributions 6.8 11.3
Others’ social contributions 1.4 1.3
Wage taxes − 1.3
VAT and other indirect taxes 11.1 10.6
Business tax* − 1.5
Taxes on capital 0.9 3.4
Households’ local tax 1.1
Households’ property tax 0.2 0.7
Company property tax 0.3 0.6




8. This strategy is advocated in OECD (2013).
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Table 3 Tax measures decided by the new government (billions of euro,







2 percentage points increase in capital
income social contributiona
+2.6 +2.6
End of tax exemption for overtime +4.0 +0.5




Social contribution on non-residents +0.25 +0.25 +0.5
Increase in wealth tax rates +1.2 +1.2
Increase in inheritance taxation +1.4 +1.4
Financial transactions tax +0.25 +0.25 +0.25
Increase in pension contributions +1.5 +1.2
Measures against firms’ tax
optimization
+1.5
Income tax rate at 45% and 75% +0.5 +0.5
Decrease in the family fiscal reduction
ceilingb
+0.5 +0.5
Non-indexation of the income tax
schedule
+1.3 +0.9
Ceiling on tax expenditure +0.4 +0.4
Taxation of dividends, interests and
financial gains at the income tax
schedule
+1.4 +1.0
Increase of taxation of real-estate gains +0.7 +0.6
Taxation of 20% of firms’ interest pay-
ments at the corporate income tax
+3.4
Taxation of companies’ capital gains +1.0
Increase in the R&D tax credit −0.2
Ecological taxes +0.2
Individual workers’ social contributions +1.3 +0.7
Social contribution paid by households
as employers
+0.3 +0.3
Wage taxc increases +0.8
Excises on beer +0.8
Pensioners’ contribution for old-care
social assurance
+0.7
Total: 32 +20.1 +11.1 +11 +1.0
Notes:
aIn France, capital incomes pay social contributions to finance universal and assistance benefits.
bDue to the quotient familial system, families with children benefit from a tax reduction. The
benefit has a ceiling, which was €2336 per child in 2012. The ceiling was reduced to €2000,
to increase taxation on richer families.
cSome sectors (like the financial sectors) do not pay VAT but are subject to a wage tax.
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Concerning income taxes on top earners, the tax rate now stands at 41 per cent for
incomes above €71 000 and 45 per cent for those above €150 000. Due to an exceptional
contribution, the tax rate is increased to 48 per cent above €250 000 and 49 per cent
above €500 000. But employees also have to pay a CRDS-CSG contribution, and their
employers pay health and family contributions (which have no ceiling). The 45 per
cent income tax rate hence translates into an effective tax rate of 60.2 per cent on higher
wages, and the 49 per cent tax rates into an effective tax rate of 63.25 per cent; which are
among the highest rates in Europe (45 per cent in the UK, 47.5 per cent inGermany, 62 per
cent in Sweden, 66 per cent in Belgium). In the 2013 budget, the French government intro-
duced, as announced by François Hollande, a tax rate of 75 per cent on wages above €1
500 000 per annum. But this was denied by the Constitutional Court as it was calculated
on an individual basis, and not on a family one. But the Government plans to reintroduce
it, paid by the firms who pay such high wage-levels.
Interest income payments bear a 15.5 per cent tax rate, as a social contribution, plus
income tax rates. Under a nominal interest rate at 4 per cent, and inflation at 2 per cent,
the real income will be 2 per cent and is taxed at a 108.8 per cent rate (for a person
at the marginal income tax rate of 41 per cent). Dividends and capital gains are
taxed at the personal income tax rate, after a 40 per cent rebate, which accounts for
the fact that dividends have already been taxed at the corporate tax; so the dividends’
effective tax rate (for a person at the marginal income tax rate of 41 per cent) is in fact
60.9 per cent. It is hard to imagine a tax reform which would make the system more
redistributive.
Thus, the government decision to cut the budget deficit through measures focusing
mainly on richer households and larger firms leads to a heavy and redistributive tax
system.9 This is rational after a crisis which has shown the risk in terms of economic
stability introduced by increases in incomes inequalities. However, it is not clear
whether France, isolated in Europe, will be able to maintain this specific taxation
structure.
The strong rise in capital gains taxation was strongly opposed by entrepreneurs who
threatened to reduce their operations in France or to leave it altogether. In April 2013,
François Hollande made a U-turn: the rebate on capital gains was increased from
40 per cent to 65 per cent (and even 85 per cent for start-ups and for entrepreneurs
retiring). The government has sacrificed its tax fairness objective to a reconciliation
objective with entrepreneurs.
5 SOCIAL POLICY
On the whole, France has until now maintained a high level of social protection, which
leads to fewer income inequalities and lower poverty rates than in Mediterranean and
Anglo-Saxon EU countries; andwithout deteriorating equality like in the Nordic countries
or Germany10 (Table 4).
There was no strong commitment in François Hollande’s programme in terms of wage
growth or social benefits increases. The minimum wage was increased by 2 per cent
in July 2012, but this brought forward the automatic increase induced by inflation,
9. Nevertheless, some authors (like Bozio et al. 2012 or Landais et al. 2011) still consider that
France could undertake a comprehensive tax reform in order to make the tax system even more
redistributive.
10. This was highlighted in OECD 2011b.
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such that the ‘coup de pouce’ (increase in purchasing power) was only 0.6 per cent. The
September school benefit (allocation de rentrée scolaire) was increased by 25 per cent,
but this was financed by lowering the quotient familial ceiling.
The government does not plan to increase family benefits and the RSA (Revenu de
Solidarité Active, the minimum income benefit) more rapidly than the consumer price
inflation rate, although these price-indexed benefits have been losing purchasing
power relative to average earnings over recent years, which has increased the poverty
rate among families. In December 2012, the prime minister promised to progressively
increase the RSA by 10 per cent, and to increase benefits for poorer single parents or
families with many children. But, in February 2013, the prime minister asked Bernard
Fragonard, the head of Family High Council, to make proposals to cut family benefits
by €2.2 billion until 2016, as a contribution to public spending cuts. This would
require jeopardizing the generosity and universality of the family benefits, even if
the French system is recognized as one of the most efficient in the OECD countries
(OECD 2011a).
In June 2012, the right to retire at 60 has been restored for workers who started
work at the age of 18 or 19 and who have paid contributions for at least 42 years
(otherwise the retirement age would have been 62 for people born in or after 1955).
This measure is expected to increase the number of pensioners by 140 000 and cost
€2.8 billion (partly offset by a €0.8 billion decrease in unemployment benefits). The
measure will be financed by a 0.5 percentage point increase in the social contribution
rate (equally split between employees and employers) that will raise €2.7 billion.
The economic crisis has worsened the pension system financial situation, which
ran a deficit of around 0.7 of a percentage point of GDP in 2012. Pension expenditures
are expected to increase from 13.5 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 15 per cent in 2050
(assuming a continuing fall in the pension/wage ratio, by 18 per cent in 2050) or
even to 17 per cent (if replacement rates are stabilized). The government plans to
launch a large debate on a pension reform in 2013. There is a risk of deteriorating
the pension system under the pretext of ensuring its sustainability. Like employers,
Table 4 Poverty rates in Europe
1997 2007 2010 Variation 2010/1997
Germany 12 15.2 15.6 +3.6
Austria 13 12 12.1 −0.9
Belgium 14 15.2 14.6 +0.6
France 15 13.1 13.5 −1.5
The Netherlands 10 10.2 10.3 +0.3
Spain 20 19.7 20.7 +0.7
Greece 21 20.3 20.1 −0.9
Italy 19 19.9 18.2 −0.8
Portugal 22 18.1 17.9 −4.1
Denmark 10 11.7 13.3 +3.3
Finland 8 13 13.1 +5.1
Sweden 8 10.5 12.9 +4.9
Ireland 19 17.2 16.1 −2.9
UK 18 18.6 17.1 −0.9
Source: Eurostat.
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the government refuses to increase social contributions rates further. It plans to
reduce the pension system deficit by removing pensions’ price-indexation and by post-
poning the retirement age, which is problematic in a situation of mass unemployment
and is not in line with the Socialist party programme.
6 EMPLOYMENT POLICY
In early 2013, the French unemployment rate reached 10.6 per cent. In the absence of
GDP growth, the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point per year. With
the potential labour force growing by 0.6 per cent per year, and accounting for firms’
labour-hoarding during the crisis, GDP would need to grow by an annual 3.2 per cent
to bring the unemployment rate to 7 per cent within 5 years.
Young people have been particularly affected by the crisis. The employment rate
in this group fell by 3.5 percentage points, while the unemployment rate rose by
2.5 percentage points (Table 5). Conversely, older workers’ activity rate rose sharply
by 8.7 percentage points, of which 1.8 percentage points are due to a rise in the
unemployment rate and 7.0 percentage points to a rise in the employment rate.
The retirement age continues to be postponed, but, in crisis times, the price seems
to be paid by young people.
In order to reduce youth unemployment, the French government plans to create 150 000
‘jobs for the future’ (emplois d’avenir). The government finances 75 per cent of the costs
of the jobs created for a period of 1 to 3 years for unskilled young people in the non-
market sector, and preferably in areas expected to expand (green jobs, care, tourism,
new technologies). At the same time, the ‘contrats de génération’ scheme will encourage
firms to simultaneously recruit a young (below 25) employee, while maintaining in
employment an older employee (aged over 57). According to the OFCE’s estimations
(see Allègre et al. 2012; Heyer/Plane 2012), these schemes will create 200 000 jobs at
the end of 2014, which is not enough to stop the increase in the unemployment rate.
President Hollande aims at reforming the labour market and social protection through
a social dialogue between trade unions and employers. A ‘social conference’ took place
in July 2012 and a social roadmap was established. Social dialogue will be enshrined in
the Constitution. The challenge is that France abandons a State-leading model to move
towards a social democratic model (with peaceful relations between trade unions and
employers, with mutually beneficial agreements) rather than towards the liberal
model (where unions’ role is denied). But this reform is not easy to introduce in
times of rising unemployment, when firms want more flexibility in terms of lay-offs,
worked hours and wages, and unions want more security and more control on lay-offs.
In January 2013, the employers’ organization (the Medef ) and three (out of five)
employees’ trade unions signed an agreement, the ANI (interprofessional national
Table 5 Employment in young and old people, since 2008
15–25 years old 25–49 years old 55–65 years old
Rates 2008-Q1 2012-Q3 2008-Q1 2012-Q3 2008-Q1 2012-Q3
Employed 31.9 28.4 −11.0% 83.5 80.9 −3.1% 37.9 44.9 +18.5%
Unemployed 6.6 9.1 +37.9% 5.7 8.0 +40.4% 1.7 3.5 +106.0%
Active 38.5 37.5 −2.6% 89.2 88.8 −0.5% 39.6 48.3 +22.0%
Source: INSEE.
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agreement), which will facilitate lay-offs, internal flexibility and agreements between
workers and employers cutting working hours and wages to maintain jobs in case of
firms’ difficulties. In exchange, the agreement discourages part-time jobs with very
few hours or with very short contract duration and generalizes supplementary health
insurances. For many economists, companies will hire more easily since they will
be no longer paralysed by the fear of not being able to lay off. For others, there is a
risk to increase the precariousness of employment. Nevertheless, both the government
and the trade unions involved in the deal seem to accept the liberal view according to
which labour market rigidities explain the unemployment level in France (as expressed
in Cahuc and Zylberberg 2009; European Commission 2013; OECD 2013) and not
macroeconomic disequilibria.
7 BANKING POLICY
In January 2012, François Hollande declared: ‘My enemy is the world of finance’. In his
programme, he had committed himself to ‘split banking activities useful to investment
and jobs from their speculative activities’ and to create a public investment bank (Ban-
que Publique d’Investissement, BPI) to support small and medium-sized firms. The
doubling of the ceiling of regulated saving accounts was supposed to allow the finan-
cing of public banking activities.
The BPI was created in November 2012 but its importance and rule are not yet
settled. On the one hand, the BPI will have regional branches where social partners
and regional authorities will attend. On the other hand, there is a risk that the BPI
will be managed only from a financial perspective, that the BPI managers wish to
show their independence and refuse to support jobs and innovation. The BPI should
have been given precise and non-standard management criteria. Last, the BPI is
expected to be allocated only €3 billion per year, which is a very limited amount.
France approves of the European banking union project, thus putting the super-
vision and regulation of its domestic banking sector in the hands of EU authorities.
But in the European project, banks are requested to diversify internationally, thus los-
ing contact with their country, companies, and government administration. The risk is
that governments depend even more on financial markets in the future. Bank lending
capacity will depend on their equities and on markets’ valuation and not on the needs
of the economy. Governments will lose their capacity to have an impact on the banks’
credit supply, which is desirable according to some views (no political interference
in credit), but is dangerous in our view (governments will lose an industrial policy
tool which could be used to finance SMEs or to boost environmental transition).
This project, based on open competition and free market rules, comes in contradiction
with the establishment of the BPI and, also, of a public bank to finance French local
government.
If the government were true to its proclaimed aims, France should have supported a
different project: restructuring the banking sector, with banks having to focus on their
core business (lending, based on a specific expertise, to national or local companies,
households and the local administration). Their solvency would have been ensured,
not by financial ratios, but by forbidding them to run risky or speculative operations
and by public support.
In early 2013, France adopted a ‘law of separation and regulation of banking activities’,
intended to implement François Hollande’s commitment. However, in fact, the govern-
ment has refused to question the French model of universal banking. Speculative
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activities, narrowly defined, will not be forbidden to retail banks, but they will have to be
put in a separate financial subsidiary. The Law demands banks to run separately their
‘unrelated to customer service’ market activities. However, banks can continue to run
operations ‘that have proved useful for the economy’. But the notion of utility is not ques-
tioned. Is the development of financial activities useful? Should banks induce non-finan-
cial agents to use toxic loans, structured products and derivatives? Similarly, the term
customer has not been specified as not to apply to hedge funds and certain investment
funds. Thus, the following activities remain allowed even after the reform: financial ser-
vices provision to customers (for hedging), coverage of the institution’s own risk (inter-
est rate risk or credit risk), implementation of structured financial products such as
derivatives activities and market-making activities. Hedge fund ownership is prohibited,
as well as unsecured loans to these funds, but so-called secured loans remain allowed. In
total, the project will only isolate 2 per cent of the banking business.
Speculative activities will have to be confined to an autonomous financial subsidiary,
which will not be guaranteed by the parent company (and therefore by public money),
will be financed independently, able to go bankrupt, and will have to develop a resolu-
tion plan showing that its bankruptcy may be supported by its creditors. Moreover,
the ‘Prudential control and resolution authority’, PCRA, may prohibit certain activities
and the Minister of Finance may require banks to limit the size of financial operations
carried out by the parent company.
It may seem strange to introduce such a law on topics that will perhaps no longer be
of national relevance in 2 years when the EU Banking union is settled. It raises once
again the question of the relationship between decisions at the national and at the
European level. For example, the PCRA may prohibit certain activities, according
to French law; but how, if these activities remain authorized at the banking union
level? Will the Minister of Finance still have some authority over banks in 2 years?
8 AN AMBITIOUS INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The French economy suffers from a rising trade deficit due to the weakness in the
manufacturing sector. François Hollande’s programme was insisting on the need to
‘relaunch production, employment and growth’. Four policies were put forward:
1. establishing the BPI;
2. supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially through
extending the R&D tax credit (Credit Impôt Recherche), increasing orders
from the public sector, the BPI, a single public interlocutor for declaration,
taxes and subsidies;
3. taxing international relocation (French companies relocating production abroad),
supporting companies investing, producing and relocating in France, reducing
corporate taxes for SMEs, introducing different tax rates for dividends and
reinvested benefits;
4. implementing a new trade policy in Europe by fighting against unfair compe-
tition, by implementing reciprocity agreements on social and environmental
areas and by decreasing the euro’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar and the
yuan.
The new government has a ministry for productive revival (ministère du redressement
productif ) with representatives appointed in each region in order to support companies
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in difficulty. The BPI is designed to finance innovative companies. The Minister
wishes to re-value the label ‘made in France’, to make clear that France produces
high quality and environmentally friendly products and to develop economic ‘patriotism’
by pushing households to buy French products.
At the EU level, France would like the Competitiveness Council to evolve and
implement an industrial policy, allowing public support to innovating firms or to threat-
ened sectors, and a more protectionist trade policy.
Thus the French strategy would involve the government in a substantial role. The
government would guide industrial development towards green and innovative products
and production techniques. It would decide on the sectors to be protected and the sectors
to be developed. These sectors would receive support through taxation, specific aids
(investment, innovation), and the BPI. The productive revival would be piloted
by the ministry, the BPI, regions, social partners, and not only by firms’ managers or
owners. This strategy is hardly consistent with EU constraints and with the functioning
of a capitalist system. It requires motivating workers in concerned companies, civil
servants in its ministry, bankers in the BPI, politicians in the regions, and companies’
managers to impel a new growth model, which is not an easy task.
8.1 A competitiveness shock?
In view of the deterioration of the French economic performance, many (among them the
MEDEF, the employers’ association, and also the CFDT, a reformist employees’ trade
union) advocate a competitiveness shock. The plan is to cut employers’ contributions,
and, as a counterpart, to increase households’ taxation, via VAT or CSG. In February
2012, the former government had decided such a measure at a limited scale, cutting
employers’ contributions by €13 billion, financed by a rise in VAT (€11 billion) and a
rise in taxes on households’ capital gains (€2 billion). The measure was to be introduced
by 1 October 2012. Following the Presidential elections, the new government abolished
this measure when it came into power, but asked Louis Gallois, former head of EADS,
who had expressed his opinion in favour of the competitiveness shock, to prepare a report
on this topic (Gallois 2012).
The ‘competitiveness shock’ philosophy is that households accept a strong fall in
purchasing power in order to improve companies’ profitability or competitiveness. In
fact, there is little difference between increasing CSG or VAT. However, a rise in VAT
increases price inflation, and this automatically affects the minimum wage rate (SMIC),
and social benefits, which are fully price-indexed and – after wage bargaining – other
wages, whichmeans that the gain in terms of companies’ competitiveness and profitability
may be short-lived. On the contrary, the victims of a rise in CSG would not benefit from
indexation rules and would have to accept a lower purchasing power. The project raises
five issues, were the current government to embark on it:
1. The government would have to request households to accept a fall in their
incomes. This would be in contradiction to the decision to abolish the VAT
increase which had been announced by the former government.
2. There are no companies’ commitments, in terms of investment and jobs in
France, in exchange for a measure that would substantially increase their profits.
There is a risk that the companies would increase their dividends or investment
abroad.
3. France is in an intermediate position between northern countries which have
improved the competitiveness and profitability of their firms at the expense of
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domestic households’ purchasing power, and southern countries where wage growth
was excessive. It would be catastrophic for the euro area if France followed the
German strategy: this would induce each MS to cut wages and social benefits with
a view to improving domestic competitiveness leading domestic consumption –
and thereafter GDP – to fall.
4. French companies’ profit share in value added stood at 29.6 per cent in 1973.
It fell to 23.1 per cent in 1982, and rebounded to 30.2 per cent in 1987. It stood at
30.8 per cent in 2006 – that is, at a satisfactory level. Since then the ratio has fallen,
due to the fall in output and labour hoarding, which in principle is a temporary
phenomenon. The fall was not caused by taxation or by excessive wage increases.
The profit share in value addedwill not be restored with the introduction of measures
leading consumption (and hence GDP) to decrease.
5. Using internal devaluation assumes that France suffers mainly from a price-
competitiveness deficit. But, de-industrialization has other and deeper roots.
Companies prefer to expand their activities in emerging countries, scientific
education is not a first choice, the young refuse to start a career in manufacturing
because job prospects appear to be too risky and wages are too low. France
has succeeded neither in protecting its traditional industries, nor in developing
innovating sectors. This would not be solved by internal devaluation.
Despite these challenges, the government decided on November 2012 to take a first
step towards a competitive real devaluation. From 2014, companies will benefit
from a tax credit for competitiveness and employment (CICE) of €20 billion, calcu-
lated as 6 per cent of their wage bill for wages between 1 and 2.5 times the minimum
wage. These €20 billion will be financed by €10 billion obtained by additional cuts
in public expenditure; by €7 billion from a VAT rise and by €3 billion from an increase
in ecological taxation in 2016. This tax credit is not subject to any condition, but
companies will have to establish a report showing that these tax credits were used
for investment, employment or R&D. These €20 billion amount to a mere 2.5 per cent
cut in total wage costs; only one-third will benefit industry. One may fear that the govern-
ment will more or less abandon any active interventionist industrial strategy to promote
a liberal policy – that is, to increase firms’ profit in praying that they will invest.
9 CONCLUSION
François Hollande’s economic strategy is ambiguous. The French President was con-
vinced that there is a need for a new policy in Europe that was more growth-targeted,
but in order to avoid a political crisis in Europe, he accepted the Fiscal Pact which forces
member states to run austerity policies. This imposes an absurd trajectory of public deficit
cuts on France, which makes fiscal policy pro-cyclical. Public deficit reductions are
expected to be obtained in the short term by higher taxation on the wealthiest and on
large companies, but in the medium term by public and social spending cuts of 3 per
cent of GDP. The European discourse on the need for structural reforms is neither clearly
accepted nor clearly rejected. The government counts on social partners to reform labour
markets, choosing the employers’ viewpoint (higher flexibility) rather than the trade
unions’ one (preventing lay-offs). He wishes both to reassure financial markets and to
reduce their influence (in particular through banking regulation and financial transaction
taxation). François Hollande is in favour of a strict separation between retail and invest-
ment banks, and for an increasing role of the investment public bank (the BPI). But he
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accepts the European banking union, where France would lose all control of its banking
system. The French banking law is very limited. The government wants to organize a
‘re-industrialization’ of the French economy, through direct support by the government,
regions and the BPI to industrial firms. But the resources allocated to this policy are
limited. The BPI is under-funded. The government does not organize the social mobiliza-
tion needed for a reform of corporate governance. Under the pressure of entrepreneurs’
organizations, the government undertook a ‘competitiveness shock’ strategy, a decrease
by €20 billion employers’ social contributions financed by public expenditure cuts and
VAT increases. The risk of this ambiguity is that the government will not convince
firms’ managers and entrepreneurs, after the tax rises in 2012–2013; it will not mobilize
workers, disappointed by the lack of social measures, the continuation of austerity poli-
cies, the shyness of economic strategy and the continued rise in unemployment.
In mid 2012, two scenarios could have been envisaged. The first was a ‘rupture
scenario’, where France would try to find an original way, Colbertist, social-democrat
and ecologist, based on public and social intervention, boosting growth, protecting the
French social model and social cohesion, preparing for environmental transition. France
would have had to find allies in Europe to implement such a strategy, with the risk of
breaking up the euro area. The second was the ‘normalization scenario’: France agrees
to implement progressively all EU measures, at the risk of a long recession and rising
unemployment, and allowing the French social model to deteriorate. Progressively,
the Ayrault government is choosing the second scenario. It is unlikely that wages and
public spending austerity and liberal ‘structural reforms’ will provoke a growth revival
in France. The French left will surrender without having even fought.
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